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Jon Teets: Book Review
Our Posthuman Future
Francis Fukuyama
One of the clearest statements of Fukuyama's purpose is this quote from the final chapter:
On the other hand, many bioethicists have become nothing more
than sophisticated (and sophistic) justifiers of whatever it is the
scientific community wants to do, having enough knowledge of Catholic
theology or Kantian metaphysics to beat back criticisms by anyone
coming out of these traditions who might object more strenuously. The
Human Genome Project from the beginning devoted 3 percent of its budget
to studying the Ethical, Social, and Legal Implications of genetic
research. This can be regarded as commendable concern for the ethical
dimensions of scientific research, or else as a kind of protection
money the scientists have to pay to keep the true ethicists off their
backs.
It is an unfair tactic to sum up an entire book with a single quote,
but the context afforded in this case is illuminating. Fukuyama boils
the debate down to that between the “true ethicists” —himself among
their numbers, naturally—and the professional bioethicists paid off by
the industry, which involves a large percentage of university
professors.
In any discussion of cloning, stem cell research, germ-line
engineering, and the like, it is usually the professional bioethicist
who can be relied on to take the most permissive position of anyone in
the room. * But if the ethicist isn't going to tell you that you can't
do something, who will?
Who indeed? Dr. Fukuyama, of course. Never mind that many "industry"
bioethicists might have spent a good deal more time thinking about the
concerns than he has. He makes it clear in the footnote to the above
quote that he regards industry bioethicists (which includes many
academics) compromised by cash:
This phenomenon is a common one and is known as regulatory
"capture," whereby the group that is supposed to be overseeing the
activities of an industry becomes an agent for the industry. This
happens for many reasons, including the dependence of the regulators on
the regulatees for money and information. In addition, there are the
career incentives that most professional bioethicists face.
The irony of this can't be clearer when one considers the
constitution of the President's Council on Bioethics, of which Fukuyama
is a panelist. We find not bioethicists of this flavor (which the
administration also appears to mistrust) but a smattering of
cherry-picked doctors, columnists, scientists and philosophers united
and distinguished not for their profound knowledge of the science and
the intricacies of ethical theory, but by their alignment with the
President's prior convictions. The only member of the group who might
lay claim to the title of bioethicist is its chairman, Leon Kass, whose
claim to fame is his history of strong opposition for and dire
predictions concerning IVF (in vitro fertilization) procedures. It's
probably not too presumptuous to christen him the cherriest of the
cherry-picked. Dr. Kass is lauded by the right for his level-headed
caution, and his pithy litmus test for biotechnological propriety “The Wisdom of Repugnance”
is quoted often. Louise Brown, the first test tube baby seems to be a
particular sticking point for this kind of wisdom. (Dr. Fukuyama
himself gives this pearl more than lip service.)
In spite of the foregoing, Our Posthuman Future —as was said of Wilson's Sociobiology
when it enflamed similar controversies nearly three decades ago—is for
the most part a surprisingly well-reasoned, balanced and a useful guide
to the debate, provided the polemical elements of the first and last
chapters are recognized.
Fukuyama takes some pain to point out the dilemmas forced on both
the right and the left by biotechnological advances. The status of
homosexuality, for example, requires new strange bedfellows. In
general, the Left has traditionally been keen to dismiss any genetic
causes for human behavior. Fukuyama points out that the Left finds
itself in the awkward position of championing homosexuality's root in
genetics, as it would put it forever out of the reach of the moralizing
of the religious right. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Left is
left toeing the slippery slope that could admit into their canon such
pariahs as intelligence testing, gene-based job inequities, and even
(gasp!) unlearned aesthetics. What good is social planning if its
promise is proscribed by the proteins coded in the genome? The Right
fares no better. Their traditional resistance to quotas might have a
natural ally in nature, but it comes at the cost of exposing their
cherished beliefs to scientific scrutiny. After all, if Don really
can't help liking Don and Donna Donna, it does not bode well for the
Don-dates-only-Donna edict. It takes some courage for right-wing think
tanker Fukuyama to chart these waters with a significantly more
balanced instrument than the reforming gambler William Bennett's Moral Compass. Through the Scylla of genetic determinism and the Charybdis of environmental determinism, starboard and port go down together.
Chapter 7, titled Human Rights begins with a quote from James Watson, the co-discoverer of the structure of DNA:
......I'd like to give up saying
rights or sanctity. Instead, say that humans have needs, and we should
try, as a social species, to respond to human needs like food or
education or health-and that's the way we should work. To try and give
it more meaning than it deserves in some quasi-mystical way is for
Steven Spielberg or somebody like that. It's just plain aura, up in the
sky-I mean, it's crap.
Fukuyama also quotes Jeremy Bentham's summation of the Rights
emitted by the French Revolution: “Nonsense upon stilts”. He
then notes:
......The more science tells us about
human nature, the more implications there are for human rights, and
hence for the design of institutions and public policies that protect
them.
It is hard to be more succinct about what is at stake. We're dealing
with the kind of thing that shakes up governments and religions, and if
that's not troubling enough, there's the whole specter of the Posthuman
waiting in the wings. Governments and religions take rather a long
time to assimilate revolutionary ideas, but now both will have to
grapple in succession with the new and profound knowledge of what it
actually means to be human followed by genetic advances that will
transform humans themselves. How does a religion adapt to average life
spans that might well exceed the entire time over which all of their
holy books were penned? What uses are healing rituals when no one gets
sick? Might those who won't need Medicare legitimately refuse to pay
into the system? What becomes of the promise of immortality, that
staple of religious attraction, when its instantiation comes as a gift
from mom and pop? As we'll see, Fukuyama chooses to shrink from
these issues, hoping to legislate them from
possibility. Ironically, this could only work if there
were a united world government -- something more believably, at least
politically, to be an End to History in Fukuyama's sense.
Fukuyama sets the table with a thumbnail sketch of the history of
the rights business. Rights (and ethics) over the centuries have been
grounded in theological fiat, natural law or, after Hume's time
so-called positivistic or “deontological” bases. Positivistic rights—
those we are most accustomed to in the modern era—are, Fukuyama quotes
William Schultz, director of Amnesty International, as saying,
“something that humans can possess or can claim, but not necessarily
something derived from the nature of the claimant.” Fukuyama takes
issue with this and spends a good portion of the rest of the chapter
building a case for why rights theory should return to the bedrock of
natural law. This is remarkable for a scholar who made his name on the
ambitiously titled The End Of History and the Last Man, where
he advanced, following his intellectual prior Hegel, the thesis that
liberal democracy represented the last possible form of government.
This represents a return to the ideas predating David Hume, going
against the magnificent deontological efforts nearly every philosopher
since. Fukuyama denies this in a peculiar monument to yoking opposites
as if by violence together:
......It is thus impossible to talk
about human rights-and therefore justice, politics, and morality more
generally-without having some concept of what human beings actually are
like as a species. To assert this is not to deny that History in the
Hegelian-Marxist sense exists. Human beings are free to shape their own
behavior because they are cultural animals capable of
self-modification.
The reason for such a contortion unfolds later in the book. Fukuyama
gets a glimpse of the comprehensive destruction of deontological
systems forced to contend with not only what humans can claim, but what
posthumans will claim. Rather than face that, he prefers to take up the
heretofore ungainly fig leaves of human nature and natural law to make
the case that we'd best stop short of changing human nature. It's the
sort of stuff that making ises out of oughts is made of.
I find it profoundly unsatisfying. I can't get past the impression that
although he stops his retrograde motion at natural law, he'd prefer to
keep going back to the theological basis. Indeed, when he states the
book's aim in the first chapter, he nearly does just this:
...... The aim of this book is to
argue that Huxley was right, that the most significant threat posed by
contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human
nature and thereby move us into a "posthuman" stage of history. This is
important, I will argue, because human nature exists, is a meaningful
concept, and has provided a stable continuity to our experience as a
species. It is, conjointly with religion, what defines our most basic
values.
The preventative mechanisms he envisions and what the President's
council is rushing to adopt include the usual array: freezing federal
research funds, research bans (backed up by prison terms) and
restriction of research publication in some cases. The net effect of
this in the case of stem cell research has been the flight of top
researchers to offshore labs. This trend looks to accelerate, and, in
the long term, this head-in-the-sand policy will leave the United
States at a profound disadvantage.
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